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Hi everybody. I’m Michael Martin. I’m a securities trader in Los Angeles. I trade stocks and futures and then options on both from time to time. So in a world that we live in where everyone’s making millions of dollars and there’s all these gurus talking about they’ve made X amount of money, I thought what I would do is offer a gesture of humility. Talk about one of my worst trading mistakes. It’s actually funny to think about now. It wasn’t so funny at the time. Now mind you, it wasn’t my biggest loss, but it was a mental error that got me thinking too. I was too relaxed, I was too casual and I ended up losing some money. Personally, I can set the story for you. I was trading wheat futures at the time, and this goes back to the early nineties, so I was just a couple years in the business.
I always was one to want to take risk home overnight over the weekend and coming into this window of time, we were in the end of June, the wheat contract had gone from four to four 40, so it was up 10% in a very short period of time. So of course I was happy. I mean, I’m generally placated no matter what happens, but the thing is, we were coming into 4th of July weekend and if I remember correctly, it was going to be a four day weekend. And normally, like I said, I really like to buy things Friday at Friday’s close. I like to take things home over the weekend. But for this period of time, again, I didn’t have a lot of experience. I was overthinking things. I was up 10% with obviously the leverage. So the account was burgeoning and a lot of clients in Chinatown, and so I remember the setup saying I probably should pair or take the trade off, but since I’m at the wirehouse, I hadn’t moved out on my own yet.
You can’t just make affect transactions in a client’s account. Everything. Either the client calls you and you have to market solicited, I mean unsolicited or you speaking with the client. It’s your idea. You have to market solicited. So there’s all this compliance that goes on. Nowadays we have full discretion, so as long as the client understands that we’re going to stay within our rules, we can buy and sell pretty much what we want as long as we adhere to this strict risk management guidelines that we promised them in the client agreement. So we had this week it was making a bunch of money. I was a little nervous over the four day weekend. I don’t know why I was, I should have just stopped and turned the screen off and gone for a walk like I normally did, but I figured, let me speak with the client. So I called the client on the phone, client’s on East Broadway in Chinatown, and I’m like, what do you feel? What are you comfortable with here? We could put in a protective stop, but that’s not going to mean anything. Over the weekend. We had futures, not options. And he’s like, you know what? You’re probably
Right. We should take it off. Let’s take it off. We’ll take our profits. But I think because the market’s moved too much, let’s go short. And I was like, go short. Maybe you got a point. Maybe there’s going to be a wave of profit taking because I can see things clearly. So we reversed course, we sold it, we took our profits. Who knows if it was the right call? Probably not, and we sold short. You had to mark the tickets in bushels at the time. So I think if I remember correctly, we sold 40,000 bushels, which is about eight contracts. So we sold eight contracts with a half an hour left in the trading day. This is me trying to get cute. So there’s a moral to this story, which I’ll get to at the end, and I should have just said to the client, I’m not comfortable doing it.
Let’s take everything. We’ll wrap it up, we’ll come back next week. But no, because I didn’t know what I wanted out of that phone call before I got on, I started letting the client come up with trading ideas, and that’s a tricky spot to be in because if the client comes up with an idea and you say, good, let’s do it, and they lose money, they’re like, why didn’t you stop me? What good are you? If they make money, they’re like, what do I need you for? You know what I mean? So you kind of lose either way. So I’m like, okay, we’ll take a smaller piece. The eight contracts were smaller than we would normally trade, and we went short half an hour left. It was going to be a quick little thing to take advantage of the fade. Now, I didn’t know about reversals as much as I do now, and there was no real reversal at that period of time.
I also didn’t have a lot of experience seeing how things can be really, really strong during the week and still close at the weekly high at Friday’s closed without looking like with the big green bar with virtually no wick. So we’re sitting there watching it again, we have a scalping, what you probably would know as a scalping position, I don’t really use this anymore. It’s either on either risk on or risk off, and nothing was happening. There was about 10 minutes left to trading and I called the client, I’ll call him Thomas, obviously he’s in Chinatown. His name wasn’t Thomas. So I called him up and I said, look, we got 10 minutes. I do not want to go home short with this. We’re not going to make or lose. It was probably one or 2 cents difference from where we had sold short and the traders calling me saying, what do you want to do here? So I had two phones going, one with the client, another one with the trading floor in Chicago, and he’s like, you know what? You’re right, just sell it. So I was like, okay, Frank, whatever your name, the trader, right? I’ll call him Frank. Frank, just sell it.
When you get a shopping delivery from Amazon Fresh or Whole Foods or Ralph’s or wherever you get your food, they don’t know what you have in inventory. If you say buy bread, buy milk, buy cereal, buy carrots, they’re just going to bring you what you order. So when I said into the trading phone, just sell the eight. That’s what the client said, which that’s not what he meant, right? He meant get out of the trade, but we were short. So I said, just sell it. He goes, okay, you’re done at 440, whatever the price was. And then I hung up the phones and it hit me a bolt of lightning like, oh my God, what the hell just happened? I saw that they would send you the execution on your screen, and then it said net position. So now I’m short 16 contracts with eight minutes to go before a four day weekend in a market that’s been going straight up all week.
I couldn’t just call the floor and reverse the trade because of compliance, so I had to run. I worked on third Avenue and the office was gigantic. It took up an entire city block, so I almost had to have a cab because I had to get to the operations booth on the caddy corner from where I was sitting. So no matter which way I was going to go, it was going to be a long way. So I remember I literally got up and I ran down to the branch manager’s office and hung a right. In the meantime, a new guy was walking through the front door. The doors were like mid-block, so to speak. We were on the 29th floor and the guy walked in and he had a big thing of papers, and I hit this guy like Lester Hayes or Jack Tatum, like a cornerback, cornerback blitz, and I took him out.
The papers went everywhere. I didn’t even have time to stop and say “I’m sorry,” because I had to get out of this trade and I’m going to tell you why in a couple minutes. It wasn’t just that. Now I doubled down on my short, so I get to the operat operations booth, and in those days you could still smoke in the city, and there was a woman sitting behind the glass and had to cut off glasses, and I’m banging on the thing frantically, I’ll call her Theresa, that’s not her name, and I was like, Theresa, I got to unwind this trade. I made a big trading error and she turned to me and she looked and she said, “booby, I’ll be with you in a minute. My daughter just broke up with her boyfriend” or something like that. So now I know why they call Depends, panties like the ultimate stop order, the bladder control, they work like a charm. I vacated my bowels right there on Third Avenue. So long story short, they did the right thing. They reversed the trade. We got out of everything. Then you got to go back and read the tape and say, okay, well look at the timestamp for the trade. What was the price? That’s what the client has to get. So if the price was different, I have to eat the error, right? That’s only fair, right? Then we have to offset the ones that the trade that we didn’t want to be in. So that also could be an error if it moved up. I’ve got to cover that. That goes into the branch error account. So I have two errors now that I got to take care of.
In the end, it was $1,250 about, if I remember, which was very painful at that time because if you remember, my account was underfunded. It might’ve been a lot of money for a newer trader. At the time, it was probably like $5 or $6k, and I was doing decent in commissions and fees to help pay my bills, which were hard, but that was a big hit to have to take. I had to call the client and tell ’em like, I made a mistake. They didn’t want to see you don’t want the paperwork to come, and they’re looking at it like, what the hell is this? I said to call the client right away and say, Hey, by the way, on that trade, I made a stupid mistake. I fixed it. It’s no error to you. You’ll see the paperwork’s going to come. They’re still going to get all the trades occurred in their account, so they’re going to get the trade confirmation, the memo as the trade memorandum confirmation.
And so I went back, man, I felt like a complete idiot because I didn’t, there was really no reason for that error to happen. It was a moment of weakness that I could have easily avoided. I wrote about this in the Inner Voice of trading, I’m pretty sure, so it might sound familiar to some of you. If you haven’t gotten it, you can get the audio book version for free. The link is in the description of this video. And so, man, I just remember feeling like a complete idiot because I lost $1,200 and there was no reason for me to even be in that trade. I shouldn’t have gone short. I should have had a plan because I was always the kind of the boss. I always had trading ideas, and that’s why they liked me. I made the money when I went out on my own.
All those people came with me. They were the founding clients of my CTA, so I did very, very well for them, and the client was like, you’re idiot. We laughed it off. They knew there was no financial responsibility on their part, but it was very humbling lesson for me that if I’m going to act like I have to adopt more professional abilities in my trading, so there was no more shooting from the hip. This is why I learned in that lesson probably going all the way back then, which is over 30 something years ago, that I don’t fade strong moves trying to get cute with the market. So when you hear me say that in other videos, this is what I’m thinking about. I know some of you might have a great sense of timing and you can nail that trade. I have pretty good intuition too, but for me, I would much rather catch the meat of the larger move than try to fade something with a scout position and make nickels and dimes.
It’s just not worth it to me. You might feel differently, and I respect that, and if you’re nailing those trades, I’ll be the first guy to stand up and say, rock and roll. It just doesn’t fit my temperament here. So it’s not like it’s a better strategy. That’s just not compatible with who I am, and that’s just the way it is. But if you’re doing it, smash it, then do it and make sure you’re levering it as much as you can. So I talked to the branch manager. The guy was a sweet guy. He was a really, really good guy. I liked him a lot. He taught me a lot about sales and marketing, and he had come up through
EF Hutton, so he knew all the guys from Hayden Stone. He knew Dick Donchian, he knew about because they were at Hayden Stone by the way, but they all became one company. When Sherson Lehman bought Hayden Stone. They bought Loeb Roads, they bought Hamill and Company, and that all was inside. Eventually Shearon, Lehman Brothers and then Sheasron Lehman had purchased Smith Barney and merged because Sandy Weil and Jamie Diamond wanted to have a salesforce. What we called, you should know this, they wanted distribution. So that’s what financial advisors are considered in management. It’s distribution. And so that acquisition, we were acquired by Shearon, and it was a real culture shock. They did things very, very differently. So that’s one of the reasons why I left, but that’s neither here nor there. The guy that I rolled over and took out with the cornerback blitz at the front door, his name, I’ll call him Peter, I came back.
So now I’m down $1,200, and now I’m thinking I’m going to get sued. I ran this guy over. My footprint was across his face, and I went back and I apologized and I spun the story. There was something going on in a client’s account. I didn’t tell him it was my fault that I didn’t know how to handle, and it had to be handled before the end of the closing bell, and I had to go speak with an operations manager immediately to make sure that the client was going to be whole or this and that. He never asked what it was, which was fine. So in his mind’s eye, he saw that it was a great sense of urgency. That guy ended up coming and becoming a client of mine and had 10 different accounts with me. So there’s the corollary later on. These clients, they went out and bought real estate. Some of them still have money with me. We have long, long relationships. So what did I learn from this? One is stay with the trend. Don’t be afraid of taking risk home over the weekend. You could always cut your position. I could have sold Decembers against my Julys and created an intra commodity spread to manage the risk. I could have sold futures and added call options.
More importantly, what I did learn to do though was I created these buck slips, and so now every order that I have, I write it out by hand and I say, here’s my entry. Here’s my number of shares or contracts. Here’s my protective stop. And that’s done for every order. I never do anything like hair trigger response. I know that’s a sensitive expression for most guys. I don’t shoot from the hip or just see something and double click the mouse. I always do something very, very intentionally and deliberately. That’s why I like to do my preparation the night before and have my orders ready. Sometimes I cancel ’em. Sometimes things move overnight. So now they’re not in the neighborhood of where I need ’em to be, but that’s fine. So I’m just editing the menu, so to speak. I know what my menu is for that day, but if the things fall away, I’ll say, okay, let me come back Tuesday.
If it’s Tuesday night, let me come back and see what we’ll do Wednesday. So no more fading moves. Write down your orders. When I call them in, I still do a lot of phone execution. I’ll read it to, I’ll say, okay, I need to buy 15 New York Gold. I’ll say 15 “1” “5”, because 15, if you’re saying it fast, it could sound like 50. So I’ll buy 15 New York Gold at X, Y, Z price on a stop, and I’ll say, read it back to me. So then they read it back to me. I put a check mark next to it. Then they enter the order and I say, okay, well what’s your ticket number then? Because they could have 50 CTAs calling in, and it’d be like, oh, it’s ticket 219. So I’ll write ticket 219. I talk to Gerard, blah, blah, blah, and then I’ll leave it in.
Then I wait for the phone to ring. If the phone rings and they say, I got a fill, I’m like, perfect. I already have my protective stop order written out, and I’ve double checked the math 10 times till Sunday, and I’ll say, okay, thank you. What’s the price? I’ll write the price. Sometimes it’s a blended price. We have sufficient slippage and skid to get our orders filled most of the time, and I’ll say, okay, I have another order for you. So I’m going to sell one five New York, and here’s my protective stop. Thank you. What’s your ticket number? This and that. And that has worked like a charm. So I don’t really make errors. It’s not that I make money all the time, and as far as like, well, what’s your biggest loss? Everything now is proportionate because it’s largely the same percentage at risk.
The numbers are obviously much larger, but the percentage of risk hasn’t really changed at all. So that’s that. So you learn from your mistakes. Obviously, that was a painful lesson to learn. It cost me some money. The branch manager said that he would eat half of it, which was a very nice gesture on his part. So it ended up costing me six and change, but I still had to do probably 1200 or so in gross commissions to offset that, right, because of the payout. So at any rate, in a world where everyone’s doing nothing but printing cash and showing you their Instagram reels and videos about how much money they’re making, I learned as it said, more from my mistakes many times than I did from my winners. So I thought you’d appreciate that story.